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Introduction 
The Covid-19 pandemic caught Israel in the midst of an unprecedented constitutional
crisis. On March 2nd, 2020, Israelis went to the polls to vote for the third time within
a year, after neither Benjamin Netanyahu nor Benny Gantz, both candidates for the
role of Prime Minister (PM), were able to form a coalition and establish a government
in either of the two previous elections. In addition, PM Netanyahu’s criminal trial for
three separate charges of corruption was scheduled to open on March 17th, 2020.
The legal measures examined below have thus been employed by an interim
government. In general, measures taken by Israel can be classified as belonging
to one of two categories: the first includes social distancing measures, which
include restrictions of movement and gatherings. The second includes technological
measures for tracking the whereabouts of individuals who tested positive to the
coronavirus.
A notable characteristic of the Israeli management of the crisis is the growing
reliance on the military and on national security agencies, with respect to both types
of measures. The sections below will examine the measures taken, the concerns
these measures raise, and the steps taken to address such concerns.
Background
Under Israel’s political system, elections to the Knesset (Israeli parliament) are
held every four years. The government operates pursuant to the confidence of
the Knesset, which implies that a candidate must command a simple majority of
Members of the Knesset (MKs) in order to form a government. In December 2018,
following a political crisis within the coalition, the coalition collapsed, and elections
were scheduled for April 2019, seven months earlier than planned. However, no
candidate was able to secure the required majority, which led to a second round
of elections, in September 2019. The same situation recurred, and a third round of
elections was held in March 2020. PM Netanyahu failed to secure a majority in these
last elections, and the majority of MKs initially stated that they oppose his continued
service as PM.
Significantly, the measures implemented by Israel to respond to the Covid-19 crisis
were introduced by an interim government which has been governing without the
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confidence of the Knesset. As a general rule, an interim government is expected to
act in restraint, as it is not representative of the people’s will. However, the Covid-19
crisis called for the use of exceptional measures.  
In addition to the lack of a permanent government, a political dispute between the
parliamentary majority and the Speaker of the Knesset led to a temporary shut-down
of the Knesset and delay in the set-up of parliamentary committees. As a result, the
initial steps taken by the government were taken without parliamentary supervision.
This has since been rectified. In addition to the permanent parliamentary
committees, a special committee dedicated to the Covid-19 crisis has been
established and is currently overseeing the measures taken. 
The Ongoing State of Emergency in Israel
While many countries have declared a state of emergency following the Covid-19
crisis, in Israel a state of national emergency already existed. Article 38 of Basic
Law: The Government states that the Knesset “may, of its own initiative or, pursuant
to a Government proposal, declare that a state of emergency exists”. A declaration
of a state of emergency by the Knesset may remain in force for up to a year. Israel
declared a state of emergency upon its establishment in 1948, and despite critiques
that claimed its cancelation is long overdue, it has been extended ever since.
In the context of the Covid-19 crisis, the state of emergency is relevant due to Article
39(a) of Basic Law which states that:
 “[d]uring a state of emergency, the Government may make emergency
regulations for the defense of the State, public security and the
maintenance of supplies and essential services”.
Article 39(c) states that:
“Emergency regulations may alter any law, temporarily suspend its effect,
or introduce conditions, and may also impose or increase taxes or other
compulsory payments unless there be another provision by law”.
The emergency situation thus grants the government the authority to enact
regulations that supersede Knesset legislation.
Restrictions on Movement and Social Distancing
Measures
Movement limitations were initially imposed by orders enacted pursuant to the Public
Health Ordinance, an ordinance enacted during the British Mandate, which entrusts
government officials with significant power. On February 2nd, 2020, the Minister of
health enacted the People’s Health Order (the new Coronavirus House Isolation and
Various orders) (Temporary Order), which imposed home isolation requirements
on those arriving to Israel from specific countries. The order has since been since
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several times, and additional orders have been enacted pursuant to the Ordinance
to expand isolation requirements, restrict public gatherings, and shut-down schools.
  On March 21st, the government employed its authority, referred to above, to enact
emergency regulations, to restrict presence in public spaces, subject to narrow
exceptions, limit work, commerce and public transportation, and define violations of
the restrictions as offences. These restrictions have been updated and their scope
expanded on an ongoing basis. Exceptions included in the first regulations, which
allowed for outdoor exercise and communal prayer in public, were revoked in later
amendments. 
The distinction between the topics addressed by the Emergency Regulations and
those addressed by orders enacted pursuant to the Public Health Ordinance is not
strict, and a certain overlap exists, which renders the normative framework unclear.
For example, the Ministry of Health issued an order that limits demonstrations to ten
participants, despite the fact that the Regulations, which supersede orders, exclude
demonstrations from the restrictions imposed, subject to keeping a required distance
between participants. 
Several issues are notable in this regard. The first is the holding of elections.
Elections in Israel took place on March 2nd, 2020. Special polling stations were set
up for Israelis that were in self-quarantine, and the elections were held as planned.
The second important issue regards the operation of the Knesset. Article 7 of the
Emergency Regulations (Novel Coronavirus – Restriction of Activity), 2020, enacted
by the government, explicitly excludes the Knesset and MKs from the restrictions
prescribed. However, the operation of the Knesset became a topic of controversy
in mid-March, when Yuli Edelstein, the former Knesset Speaker, adjourned the
Knesset, despite the request of the majority of MKs to hold discussions, and refused
to convene the Knesset for the purpose of electing a new Speaker and establishing
parliamentary committees.
The dispute was, first and foremost, a political dispute, characterized by a power
struggle between the Speaker and the majority of MKs. At least for the time being,
the dispute has subsided, and the Knesset has resumed its discussions. Notably,
however, public health arguments were also brought up as a justification for
adjournment. Thus, media outlets reported that Edelstein, as well as PM Netanyahu
and a number of the other ministers of the interim government, argued that MKs
should “set an example” to the public and seize their meetings, which would result
in a shut-down of the Knesset. It was also reported that the Edelstein sought, based
on social distancing criteria, to impose restrictions on the number of members of
the Organizing Committee, the parliamentary committee that is responsible for
establishing other parliamentary committees, in a manner that will affects its political
composition. While these attempts did not eventually materialize, with the exception
of social-distancing restrictions placed by the Speaker on the mode of operations of
parliamentary committees, they should serve as caution against the manner in which
public health arguments can be employed and manipulated to advance political
agendas.
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The third notable issue is the operation of courts. On March 12th, 2020, Minister
of Justice Amir Ohana amended the Court’s Regulations to include a situation of a
health emergency, and enacted an emergency order that restricted the operation
of the courts, determining that they will operate in emergency mode and will only
discuss urgent matters. The order was politically contentious, in particular due to the
fact due to the fact that PM Netanyahu’s criminal trial was set to open on March 17th,
2020.  Shortly after it was enacted, the opening of Netanya’s trial was postponed
to May 24th.  However, Supreme Court President, Ester Hayut, published a letter
which endorses the decision to minimize the courts’ operation, citing the importance
of deferring to public safety. The emergency mode was extended, for the time being,
until April 16th, 2020. A petition challenging the partial closure of court has been
filed to the Supreme Court. It was rejected due to lack of exhaustion of procedural
remedies. A general petition challenging the amendment of the Court Regulations
was deleted after the parties agreed to examine the possibility of addressing the
issue by primary legislation after the Covid-19 crisis ends.
Tracking and Surveillance
In addition to social distancing measures, the Israeli government sought to employ
technology to track those who tested positive to coronavirus, in order to identify
individuals who came into their close proximity. The relevant technology was
developed for national security purposes and used by the military and by the General
Security Service (the “Service”).  As the technology itself is considered confidential,
the government entrusted the task to the Service, rather than to the civil authorities.
The tracking measures were discussed upon the adjournment of the 22nd Knesset,
shortly before the 23rd Knesset was sworn in. Due to the refusal of the relevant
parliamentary committee of the 22nd Knesset to swiftly approve the measures, the
government bypassed the need to receive such approval by enacting emergency
regulations for a period of two weeks. The regulations are confidential, and thus
their exact scope and content is unknown. A petition challenging the enactment of
the regulations was filed to the Supreme Court, which delivered an interim decision
that limited the authority of the Service to employ tracking measures until March
24th, 2020, subject to the establishment of parliamentary committees, including the
Knesset Service Affairs Committee.  Such committees were indeed established,
and therefore the limitation did not come into force. The general petition against the
tracking measures is still standing.
The Knesset Service Affairs Committee approved the employment of military cellular
tracking technology pursuant to article 7(B)(6), of the General Security Service
Law, 5762-2002, which allows the service to perform “activities in any other area
determined by the Government, with the approval of the Knesset Service Affairs
Committee, which is designed to safeguard and promote State interests vital to the
national security of the State”. The authorization includes a sunset clause which
determines that it will end on April 30th, 2020.The committee required the state to
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examine less invasive alternatives during this period, and to present them to the
committee. The information the Service is allowed to share with the Ministry of
Health includes real-time locations of confirmed Covid-19 patients in the 14 days
that preceded diagnosis and the personal details of individuals who came into “close
contact” with such patients. The Ministry of Health will use this information to inform
those who came in contact with a Covid -19 patient that they are required to enter
isolation.
Media outlets reported additional initiatives to employ technological measures in
the struggle against Covid-19, including an initiative of Minister of Defense Naftali
Bennet to employ the controversial cyber security company NSO to assess the risks
of infection and outbreak, including the risk of specific individuals to test positive for
Covid-19. This initiative has encountered objections among MKs, who claimed it
was incompatible with the right to privacy, and within the Ministry of Justice, which
expressed concerns about transferring information about individuals collected by the
Service to a private company. 
Involvement of the Military and the General Security
Service
Cellular tracking is performed by the Service, and the details of the process are
confidential. During the discussions of the Service Affairs Committee it was revealed
that the breadth of information collected was wide, and the authorization limited the
information that is to be transferred by the General Security Service to the Ministry of
Health.
 In addition, it was reported that the Military was called upon to improve data
management and methodologies, and that non-armed soldiers will assist the police
in enforcement of social distancing measures. The military was also employed
to assist in imposing a closure on the Ultra-Orthodox city of Bnei-Brak, an major
epicenter of the outbreak. The situation in several Ultra-Orthodox cities and
neighborhoods is especially severe, in part because of religious exemptions to social
distancing restrictions, that were initially included, and have since been revoked,
and in part due to initial non-compliance and lenient enforcement of restrictions. It
has been reported that the military will be recruited to evacuate the elderly, manage
these areas, and provide aid.
The involvement of the military and of the Service in the management of the crisis
thus appears to be growing. While the expertise and logistical abilities of these
bodies may render them effective, a plethora of issues may arise from entrusting
them with tasks related to the management of a civilian crisis.  Their engagement
thus needs to be closely monitored.
Conclusion
Four main observations can be made regarding Israel’s response to the coronavirus
crisis so far. The first is the concern that the crisis will be used as a disguise to
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further the political goals of governmental actors that are not related to the crisis. The
second, related concern, is that it may give rise to the use of measures that violate
human rights, in particular, the right to privacy. The third observation regards the role
of the military and of national security agencies in responding to the crisis. In Israel,
the involvement of the military and the Service is growing as the crisis unfolds. The
fourth observation regards the importance of review and supervision. Virtually all
measures employed in Israel were reviewed by either a parliamentary committee,
the Supreme Court, or both. This review, which is ongoing, affected the scope and
length of measurements taken. It thus demonstrates the importance of maintaining
effective institutions, including courts, throughout the Covid-19 crisis, and in ensuring
ongoing review and supervision of measures taken, as a safeguard against both
political abuse and violations of rights. Such supervision is particularly important
when confidential instruments of national security are employed, and when civilian
tasks are delegated to the military and national security agencies. 
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